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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellee accepts appellant's characterization of the issues
presented for review and the applicable standards of review,
except to note that jury instructions are reviewed not only for
correctness, but also to determine whether prejudice resulted.
Ames v. Maas, 846 P2d 468, 471 (Utah App 1993).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
The following are rules, the interpretation of which are
pertinent to this appeal:
Rule 16, Utah R Civ P, enclosed at Appendix 1.
Rule 37, Utah R Civ P, enclosed at Appendix 2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action in negligence brought by Melvin Laws who
was injured when he fell into the Blanding City Dump.

The action

was initiated against Blanding City in November of 1991 and tried
before a jury in February 1994.
During the course of discovery and after issuance of a
scheduling order, Plaintiff failed to designate an individual who
would testify as expert witness on his behalf.

Defendant

received notice of the designated individual substantially past
the witness designation date and three days after the discovery
cutoff date.

Defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff's

expert witness which was granted by the court.
1

During the trial, plaintiff's counsel objected to the jury
instructions, in particular instruction 17. The court overruled
the objection.

The jury found no negligence on the defendant's

part and returned a verdict in its favor.

Plaintiff filed a

motion for a new trial which was denied and subsequently appeals
to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

A complaint initiating this action was filed with the

trial court on November 4, 1991.
2.

(R. 1-7)

On December 17, 1991, defendant served its first

discovery requests on plaintiff.

(R. 21-22)

In those discovery

requests were the following interrogatories:
Interrogatory No. 25: Identify each
person who you expect to call as an expert
witness at trial.
Interrogatory No. 26: State the subject
matter on which each said expert is expected
to testify, state the substance of the facts
and opinions to which said expert is expected
to testify, and state a summary of grounds
for each opinion.
Interrogatory No. 27: Identify each
expert who has been retained or specially
employed in anticipation or [sic] litigation
or preparation for trial but who is not
expected to be called as a witness at trial.
(Appendix 1)
3.

Plaintiff served replies to defendants first discovery

on January 16, 1992. (R. 23)

Plaintiff's answers at that time

did not designate an individual who would testify as an expert
witness at trial.
4.

On June 14, 1993, the trial court entered a scheduling

order designating August 15, 1993 as the date for designation of
2

expert witnesses and October 3, 1993 as the cutoff date for
discovery.
5.

(R. 288-89)

On August 31, 1993 plaintiff's counsel, Darwin Fisher,

arranged a conference call with Judge Anderson and defense
counsel and requested that the June 14, 1993 Scheduling Order be
amended given the fact that Wayne Watson, counsel for plaintiff
at the time of the June 14, 1993 scheduling conference had
withdrawn.

As a result of Mr. Fisher's request, the scheduling

order was amended with the following new dates: Trial commencing
February 21, 1994; Final Pretrial Conference on January 20, 1994;
Dispositive Motion deadline as December 31, 1993; Discovery
Cutoff as December 10, 1993; Witness Designation by all parties
as September 30, 1993.

On December 2, 1993, the trial court

formalized this order by entering an amended scheduling order.
(R. 358-59)
6.

Defendant filed its designation of witnesses with the

trial court on September 17, 1993.
7.

Plaintiff filed his designation of witnesses with the

trial court on October 1, 1993.
8.

(R. 300-301)

(R. 302-304).

Plaintiff's designation of witnesses did not identify an

individual who would testify as expert witness at trial.
following non-individuals were designated as witnesses:
12.
14.
33.
70.
72.

Montgomery Engineering
Eckoff, Proctor & Watson
Lynn Haws & Sons
Mercy Medical Center
San Juan County Hospital

(R. 302-304)
3

The

9.

No ir

would

provide an expert and

information was provi ded which would

1. ixcate uiiti identity

location of the witness.

in

n

n Octobe

supplement answers

requested that; plaintiff
interrogatories, restating the

i j i n i],i" i i;i i|.11 iJi jes N o . 25 through 27 set forth in paragraph 2.
above.

(R. 309-310)
November 24, 1993, nearly eight weeks after the
*te and pproximately two weeks prior to

discovery cutoff, defendant sent

( f'* s n, i

requesting identification of plaintiff's expert witness on
1
In the last several weeks, you told m e that
you would inform m e of w h o would actually be
your expert witness on liability, 1 still do
not have that information. Since I do not
have t h e information I cannot notice up that
expert witness. This presents a problem for
me given the December 10, 1993 discovery
cutoff. Please advise m e as soon as y o u can
of the name of the liability expert witness
you intend to u s e so that w e can make
arrangements t o have that witness 7 deposition
taken on or before December 10, 1993 it [sic]
at a] ] possible.
(R. 394-395 f enclosed
12-.

\* Appendix 2)

On 1 'i.'uomb

« MI d.iyi prior tn discovery cutoff, and

67 days after the court ordered deadline, p l a i n t i f f s counsel
wrote <i letter to defendar
ECKH01T

counsel stating that Greg Thorpe of
s di nidi.

!!" I ,ii||

Had that information been immediately available to defendant (on

4

December 6), defendant could not possibly have taken Mr. Thorpe's
deposition because he had not evaluated the case.
I am in the process of sending information to
Mr. Thorpe for his evaluation and therefore
he obviously has not had an opportunity to
review the information and form an opinion.
(R. 392, copy enclosed as Appendix 3)
13.

Because plaintiff's counsel used the wrong zip code in

addressing the December 6 letter, it was not received by
defendant until December 13, 1993f three days after discovery
cutoff.

(R. 388)

The zip code used by plaintiff was appropriate

for defendant's counsel's post office box.

For the street

address, the proper zip code is 84111.
14.

On December 14, 1993, plaintiff filed with the trial

court his supplementation of his answers to defendant's
interrogatories, again designating Greg Thorpe as the expert
witness.
15.

(R. 360-362, enclosed as Appendix 4)
On January 7, 1994, defendant filed a motion to strike

plaintiff's designation of Mr. Thorpe as an expert witness and to
exclude Mr. Thorpe's testimony from trial.
16.

(R. 364)

On February 2, 1994, the trial court granted

defendant's motion to strike and issued a written ruling on the
motion.

(R. 413-415, enclosed as Appendix 5)

ruling was based on two conclusions.

The trial court's

First, the court held that

"Plaintiff did not properly designate his expert witness until he
provided the name of an individual."

(R. 414)

Second, the court

stated that even if it were technically sufficient to designate
an expert who had not formed an opinion, "the expert must, at the
5

very least, be prepared wi"

within a reasonable time

before discovery ends,,11

emphasis added.)

"The? trial

, .HIi "I "I li MI .' bserved that exclusion o*. w*i«_ expert evidence was
prejudicial

l11-11 4 ! "=>>
i trial, plaintiff objected to jury instruction No. n 7

c

ruction did not accurately state the law.

(

18.

Among the instructions issued to the jury were
1::l:i:i : o\ lgl i 2 0 k 1: i :i • : Jt : Instructed on negligence,

i

including comparative negligence.

(H. I|;I^II-IH? «i, nnc I osed

Appendix 6)
19.

Tin? n i.iii HI in I ,ur,o i "if .IJKMJ t«i l.lir! jury <i S p e c i a l

Verdict Form which provided for a finding ol
negligence.
20.

comparative

(R. 501-502, enclosed as Appendix

Tin* iiiiijii \ 'i uiiip l e t e d

l.li

Special

that defendant was not negligent.

> f^fd

•_ form

indicating

(R. 502)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaint i I i ti.ui 1'.r liiniJi'i, n| ih.iv..ii I ••

IM

,

complying with procedural rules and court orders.

I "w,inJ and of

He cannot

shift this burden to the court, the defendant or his retained
engineering firm.
The fact that plaintif r misunderstood the meaning ^ the
1

/itness" does not excuse ^

trial court's scheduling order.

r-.«

ith the
;

required the designation of
i

failure

iesignation

*de.

6

The trial court has the discretion under Rule 16, Utah R Civ
P to exclude witness testimony for failure to comply with a
scheduling order.

Given that the plaintiff's designation of an

individual as expert witness was made after the designation date
and effectively after discovery cutoff, the trial court's
exclusion of plaintiff's expert witness testimony was not an
abuse of discretion.
Viewed in context of all instructions issued to the jury and
along with the interrogatories of the special verdict form, the
jury instructions properly advised the jury as to the applicable
law in this case.
Even if error were found in excluding the expert witness
testimony or in using the allegedly offending jury instruction,
such error does not amount to reversible error because plaintiff
has failed to show that the alleged error prejudiced his case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS THE PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN TO UNDERSTAND
THE LAW AND PROCEDURAL RULES AND TO PROSECUTE
THE CASE WITH DUE DILIGENCE. PLAINTIFF
CANNOT SHIFT THAT BURDEN TO THE DEFENDANT,
THE COURT, OR ANY OTHER PARTY.
Plaintiff argues that "Plaintiff did not willfully disregard
the court's scheduling order.

Plaintiff simply did not

understand the court's unexpressed expectations."
Appellant, p. 8.

Brief of

He would shift the responsibility for this

failure to understand to the court or the defendant.
7

"A motion

to compel on the oc

f

Defendant, would have sufficiently notified Plaintiff of his
error."

Brief of Appellant

<.

Further, "Following

Defendant's receipt

id

have moved to compel the Plaintiff
9.
burden

)efendant

Brief

Alternativelyf plaintiff would shift the

ngineering f Irm -

would testify

expert

rganization
advise xu

a

t its duty to make a

designation of the individual who will testify on its behalf.
Brief
;

? n

;

emphasis added.

. ...

defendant
rules o

Apparently, plaintiff

/ ol ti
assure that pla^ :

' : •

^crt and of

properly inte

i<| lie

procedure and properly prosecuting his case.

Plaint, in- also bo I i.e OJS tllnat tin? oncji neei i mi firm he has retained
has the duty to comply with the rules oi civil procedure ar
scheduling order.
Our legal system is .iiii nMvorsary system in which the judge
traditionally is nut an active participant.

The judge's rol e is

to decide disputed procedural and legal questions and,
appropriate cases, r.u • I a;*. I In- fintlra mill larl ,

lllii

adversary

system, attorneys for each party are charged with conducting
their cases in the best interests of. their clients.
a- leading handbook m

As stated in

r i v i I | i o< odure,

Issues n o t raised, objections
and points not made are, with
exceptions, waived. The case
in response to the demands of
8

n o t mentioned,
very few
proceeds only
the litigants.

Necessarily, then, the adversary model places
enormous emphasis and responsibility on the
lawyers; the court maintains a relatively
passive role throughout the proceedings.
Friedenthal et al., Civil

Procedure

(1985) § 1.1, p. 2.

With the burden on the attorneys, it becomes important for
an attorney to understand how an adversarial proceeding is
conducted.
[I]t remains true that for the vast majority
of civil cases, the ultimate responsibility
remains with the attorneys and it is
imperative that they be fully familiar with
all the applicable procedural rules so as to
ensure the most effective representation of
their clients.
Id.

at p. 3, emphasis added.
The plaintiff has the burden to prosecute his case with due

diligence.

Sports

E.g.,

Incorporated,

Charlie

Brown Construction

Co.,

Inc.

740 P2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1987).

v.

Leisure

Delays or

failures of a law office to move forward procedurally are
unacceptable excuses for failing to meet this burden.

Id.

at

1371.
If, as argued by plaintiff, he failed to understand the
meaning of the scheduling order, it is not the responsibility of
either the court or the opposing party to cure that
misunderstanding.

Plaintiff's lack of understanding of the court

system causes him to argue that the court should have issued an
order to compel soon after filing of the witness designation.
The court has neither the time nor the responsibility for
reviewing witness designations to assure a party's understanding

9

of what a witness i s.

•-

to make a motion to compel.
p-

argues that lie should

"Defendant

* sanctioned

diligence

"

Brief of Appellant,

however, plaintiff's lack

I 11 i
n I i i|i>inv ","%",,
has the burden

- lure tu aou wu

•

laintiff

advancing his case

procedural ri: -.

looking out -

tI

hir lies'1 interests.

It

;si ire the proper answerinc

;errogatories and compliance with court schedui
cannot shift this burden
system

3

question

'in II i

i

1n*?*• participants in the adversary

I nisi

ned.

POINT II
UNDER ALL REASONABLE DEFINITIONS# A WITNESS
IS AN INDIVIDUAL, NOT AN ENTITY. DESIGNATION
OF A WITNESS, THEREFORE, REQUIRES DESIGNATION
OF AN INDIVIDUAL, NOT AN ENTITY.
It is the responsibilii

attorney to "possess the

legal knowledge and skills common
and to represe

diligence."

nembers of his profession
irompetvmy^

• •

Jacksc

-, :)abney,

Certainly the definitior

• * • r v:

;

JIII4

- 615 (Utah 198*,.

"witness" should fall within the

legal knowledge
A review
c

i uiiac

601 states that,

the Utah Rules

Evidence clearly leads to the

^tness must be a perso*
-^r-v person

i s comp<

Rule 601, Utah R Evid, emphasis added.
10

an entit^

e
."

There is no way to imply

that an entity, in this case an engineering firm, can be a
witness.

Rule 602 requires that a witness have

knowledge to testify as to a matter.

personal

Rule 603 requires that a

witness declare by oath or affirmation, an action which an entity
cannot take.
Looking in a legal dictionary, one can find the following
definitions relevant to this issue:
Witness A person whose declaration under
oath (or affirmation) is received as evidence
for any purpose. . .
Expert One who is knowledgeable in
specialized field, that knowledge being
obtained from either education or personal
experience. One who by habits of life and
business has peculiar skill in forming
opinion on subject in dispute.
Expert testimony Opinion evidence of some
person who possesses special skill or
knowledge . . . Testimony given in relation
to some scientific, technical or professional
matter by experts, i.e., persons qualified to
speak authoritatively by reason of their
special training, skill or familiarity. . .
Expert witness One who by reason of
education or specialized experience possesses
superior knowledge respecting a subject . . .
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5 ed. (1979), emphasis added.
There is no question that only a person can be a witness.
It follows, therefore, that a scheduling order specifying a date
for designation of "witnesses11 or "expert witnesses" requires
designation of an individual

who will testify at trial, not an

entity who will provide that individual.
Plaintiff attempts to avoid responsibility for
misunderstanding the word "witness" by shifting the focus to the
11

trial court, stating "the courts failure to expressly require
what it expected caused confusion and ultimately prejudiced the
Plaintiff's case."
weak.

Brief of Appellant p. 20. The excuse is

"Witness" is a word commonly used in the legal community

and routinely understood to be a person.

This is a fundamental

term which should be understood by all attorneys.

That plaintiff

failed to understand this common use in law does not excuse his
failure to timely designate an individual as his expert witness.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT FOR
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
SCHEDULING ORDER.

If a p a r t y f a i l s t o comply with the terms of a scheduling or
p r e t r i a l order, sanctions specified in Rule 16(d) are
appropriate:

(1) the court may enter an order p r o h i b i t i n g the

i n t r o d u c t i o n of designated matters i n t o evidence; and (2) the
court may find t h e attorney or party in contempt of c o u r t .
16(d), Utah R Civ P.

Rule

There i s no requirement in t h e r u l e or Utah

case law t h a t the noncompliance be w i l l f u l , as argued by
plaintiff.-{

Nor i s t h e r e a requirement, as argued by p l a i n t i f f ,

t h a t witness exclusion not be u t i l i z e d where other options are
a v a i l a b l e t o the court.- 7
- ' P l a i n t i f f r e l i e s on Arizona case law which imposes an express requirement
t h a t t h e disregard of a scheduling order be w i l l f u l .
Utah case law has l e f t
the d e c i s i o n t o the d i s c r e t i o n of the t r i a l court t o be made i n the e n t i r e
circumstances surrounding the f a i l u r e t o comply with the order.
- In a l l of the Utah c a s e s upholding e x c l u s i o n of w i t n e s s e s for f a i l u r e t o
comply with a scheduling order, "other options" were a v a i l a b l e .
In none of
t h e s e c a s e s did the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court require sanctioning
by t h e s e other options in place of witness e x c l u s i o n .

12

Utah law has repeatedly supported trial court discretion in
excluding expert witnesses for failure to comply with Rule 16.
E.g.,

Arnold

v.

Hardy v. Hardy,

Curtis,

846 P2d 1307 (Utah 1993).

See

also,

776 P2d 917, 925 (Utah App 1989) ("The trial

court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence
which is not timely provided to the opposing party contrary to
the court's instructions.11)

The sanction of witness exclusion

has been balanced against the needs of the parties and determined
to be appropriate to ensure the efficacy of scheduling orders.
While scheduling orders should never be so
inflexible as to not accommodate exigencies
that may occur, they are necessary to
expedite the flow of cases through the court
system and should not be lightly disregarded.
Arnold at 1310.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in
DeBry

v.

In DeBry,

Cascade

Enterprises,

242 Utah Adv Rep 17 (Utah 1994).

the plaintiffs argued that exclusion of their four

expert witnesses for failure to timely designate them was an
abuse of discretion because plaintiffs' supplemental responses to
discovery had "put the defendants on notice that the DeBrys
intended to call the four expert witnesses they later
designated."

DeBry at 21.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, discussing the
purpose of scheduling orders and the discretion of the trial
court in enforcing those orders.
The DeBrys' supplemental responses to
interrogatories stated that they had retained
eleven experts to assist them in the
litigation; the response did not specify any
13

witness who would testify at trial. The
purpose of the scheduling order was to save
the defendants from having to assume that all
eleven witnesses would be called at trial and
from incurring the expense of having to
prepare for testimony that would not be
presented.
A trial court has necessary discretion in
managing cases by pretrial scheduling and
management conferences. Utah R. Civ. P. 16.
A requirement that parties designate their
expert witnesses by a certain date before
trial allows the parties to prepare for trial
by deposing witnesses, planning for effective
cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal
testimony. See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d
1021, 1023-24 (Utah 1994); Utah R. Civ. P.
16(b); see also Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917,
925 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DeBry at 21. Noting that the plaintiffs had submitted their
witness designations after the date ordered and after the
discovery cutoff date, the Supreme Court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in excluding the four expert
witnesses.

Id.

In the present case, despite repeated requests to do so,
plaintiff failed to designate an individual as his expert witness
until well after the designation date and, effectively, after the
discovery cutoff date.
expert to testify.

Plaintiff also failed to prepare his

Defendant had no real means of properly

deposing the expert without violating the court's scheduling
order.
Attempting to shift responsibility to the defendant,
plaintiff argues, without authority, that, "The fact that the
individual selected to testify is not designated does not relieve
Defendant from the obligation of noticing the deposition of
14

Eckhoff, Watson & Preator."

Brief of Appellant p. 15.

In its

ruling on defendant's motion, the trial court addressed this
issue, noting that "It is unreasonable to expect a party to
examine every member of a firm in order to make sure that the
eventual witness has been deposed."

R. 414-15, Appendix 5.

This

is consistent with the Supreme Court's observation in DeBry that
the purpose of the scheduling order is to prevent defendant from
incurring the expense involved in this type of examination.
Assuming, as plaintiff argues, that defendant was put on notice
by his designation of an engineering firm as expert witness, the
holding in DeBry would justify exclusion of the individual
witness who was untimely designated.
The trial court's second basis for excluding the expert
testimony is also supported by the Supreme Court's DeBry holding.
As noted by the trial court and stated by plaintiff, plaintiff's
designated expert was not prepared to offer an opinion in the
case.-7 The untimely designation of the expert witness, combined
with the fact that the witness was not prepared to offer
deposition testimony, effectively prevented defendant from
preparing "for trial by deposing witnesses, planning for
effective cross-examination, and obtaining rebuttal testimony."
Plaintiff argues that he proposed to defendant that the
expert be deposed at any time despite the discovery cutoff order.

- We may infer from the circumstances that if the individual at the
designated engineering firm had not yet evaluated plaintiff's case, then no
one there had; i.e., that no one at the designated firm was prepared to
testify or be deposed.

15

Brief of Appellant, p. 5 5 23, citing R. 465. This simply
reflects plaintiff's attitude toward court scheduling orders in
general.

Attitude issues aside, parties may not stipulate to set

aside a court-ordered deadline without a subsequent court order,
especially where the stipulation interferes with the court's
control of its own calendar.

Charlie

Brown at 1371.

Given that (1) the expert was not timely designated and (2)
when designated, the expert was not prepared to participate in
pretrial discovery before the cutoff date, the trial court's
exclusion of that expert's testimony was clearly not an abuse of
discretion.
POINT IV
EXCLUSION OF THE EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY IN
THIS CASE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Even if this Court were to find the trial court's exclusion
of expert witness testimony to be an abuse of discretion,
plaintiff has made no showing that exclusion of that testimony
was prejudicial to plaintiff's case.

The simple fact that the

jury decided against plaintiff does not indicate prejudice.
As noted by the trial court,
It is not essential to the plaintiff's case
that he have an expert on the design,
construction, maintenance and operation of
dumps. Dumps are something within the ken of
ordinary citizens. Though expert testimony
may be helpful, the Court expects that the
members of the jury will be able to determine
whether defendant negligently operated the
dump without the assistance of an expert.
R. 415, Appendix 5.

Where other witnesses are able to testify as

to the facts and circumstances surrounding alleged negligence,
16

exclusion of expert testimony is not prejudicial.
Jay Tuft

& Co.,

622 P2d 1168, 1173 (Utah 1980).

Shurtleff

v.

In this case,

plaintiff has not demonstrated that exclusion of his expert's
testimony worked to his prejudice.
On the other hand, allowing plaintiff's expert to testify
would clearly have prejudiced defendant's case.

Plaintiff

argues, without supporting authority, that defendant's case was
not prejudiced by his failure to designate the expert witness.
The Utah Supreme Court in Debry, however, has taken the opposite
position.

Noting that the trial court found that permitting the

experts to testify despite the failure to designate would work
prejudicially against defendants, the Supreme Court stated, "For
the trial court to have ignored the deadline would have
compounded that abuse for which the [plaintiffs] were in no small
measure responsible."

DeBry at 21.

Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence in support of his
claim of prejudice, making any error in excluding the expert
testimony harmless, non-reversible error.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT'S ISSUANCE OF JURY
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Jury Instruction No. 17 states:
Blanding City is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to Melvin Laws by a
dangerous condition at the Blanding City dump
if, but only if, Blanding City:
(a) knew of the dangerous condition, or by
the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered the dangerous condition, and
should have realized that the dangerous
17

condition involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to Melvin Laws, and
(b) should expect that Mel Laws will not
discover or realize the danger, or would fail
to protect himself against it, and
(c) Blanding City then failed to exercise
reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws from
the dangerous condition
A.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 IS CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE CASE
LAW.
Plaintiff exhibits some confusion as to how the appropriate

statement of the law is determined.

He states, "Jury

instructions must not only instruct the jury as to the law of the
jurisdiction, but the instructions given must also 'be
appropriate to the fact situation of the case as revealed by the
evidence."

Brief of Appellant p. 29.

determined by the facts.

The law is, in fact,

In the area of premises liability,

different facts may dictate a different law.

For example, the

duty of a landlord in maintaining his premises with respect to a
tenant is somewhat different from the duty of a possessor of land
with respect to an invitee.

E.g.,

English

v. Kienke,

848 P2d 153

(Utah 1993).
The language of Instruction No. 17 is taken substantially
verbatim from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343, dealing
with the duty owed by a possessor of land to an invitee, which
provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a
condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of
reasonable care would discover the
condition and should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
such invitees, and
18

(b) should expect that they will not
discover or realize the danger, or will
fail to protect themselves against it,
and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to
protect them against the danger.
This section of the restatement imposes on a landowner in
possession a duty to warn an invitee of two categories of
hazards: "(1) those that are present on the land when the invitee
enters which the possessor should expect that the invitee will
not discover or realize, and (2) those that the possessor creates
after the invitee's entry. . ." English

at 156, emphasis added.

Plaintiff acknowledges that this is a correct statement of
the law regarding premises liability.

Brief of Appellant, p. 29.

He somewhat incongruously argues that this correct statement of
the law is applicable only in determining summary judgment and is
improper for use in instructing the jury as to the law of
premises liability and that the facts of this case justify an
instruction other than this correct statement of the law.

Brief

of Appellant, p. 30. However, plaintiff cites no authority in
support of this unusual position.
English

Certainly the Supreme Court in

made no such distinction.

Lacking any authority in support of plaintiff's argument, we
must conclude that § 343 of the Restatement and its near-twin
Instruction No. 17 are correct statements of the law of premises
liability and that issuance of Instruction No. 17 to the jury was
proper.
B.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER INSTRUCTIONS AND THE SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM, JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 PROPERLY INSTRUCTS THE
JURY ON THE LAW OP COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
19

Plaintiff's argument as to the appropriateness of
Instruction No. 17 is somewhat disjointed and difficult to
address in rebuttal.

It is perhaps easier to review Utah law

dealing with the issuance of jury instructions and draw
conclusions from that.
In determining whether giving a jury instruction constitutes
reversible error, the court must evaluate the instruction in the
context of the entire set of jury instructions to decide "whether
all the instructions read in harmony fairly presented to the jury
in a clear and understandable way the issues of fact and
applicable law."
1983).

Anderson

v. Toone,

671 P2d 170, 175 (Utah

On appeal, the trial court's determination of which jury

instructions to issue will be affirmed "when the jury
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case." Ames v. Maas, 846 P2d 468, 471 (Utah
App 1993).

If a jury instruction is erroneous, that error can be

cured by use of a special verdict which contains an interrogatory
based upon the correct law.
Eskelson

v. Ballhaus,

Anderson

at 175.

For example, in

622 P2d 798 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme

Court held that a jury instruction, which examined alone might be
erroneous, was non-prejudicial in view of other instructions
issued and a special verdict which directed the jury to allocate
100 percent negligence between plaintiff and defendant if the
jury found both parties to be negligent.
It appears from plaintiff's argument that his main objection
to Instruction No. 17 is his belief that it forces the jury to
20

find in favor of the defendant and improperly instructs the jury
to apply the law of contributory negligence instead of the law of
comparative negligence.

The entirety of the instructions issued

to the jury fails to support this argument.
Plaintiff also confuses the issues of contributory and
comparative negligence and the effect which Instruction No. 17
has in context of determining defendant's liability for its own
negligence.

The proper application of the law of comparative

negligence requires four steps.

First, the finder of fact must

determine whether, under the appropriate law, the defendant was
negligent.

If that conclusion is made in the affirmative, the

finder of fact must then determine whether the plaintiff was
negligent.

If both parties are found to be negligent, then the

finder of fact must allocate to each party his share of
responsibility for negligence.

Finally, that allocation of

negligence is used to determine who should bear what amount of
the damages.
The first step of this process requires that the jury be
instructed on the law controlling the decision of whether the
defendant was negligent.

Only after the issue of defendant's

negligence has been decided is it appropriate for the jury to
look at the law of comparative negligence.
Defendant acknowledges that Utah's adoption of comparative
negligence supplanted principles of contributory negligence.
Defendant has never argued that plaintiff's actions should
entirely preclude any recovery.

It is clear from the record that
21

the trial court was aware of and applied comparative negligence
in its instructions to the jury.

The central question is

whether, in the entirety, the jury instructions properly
instructed the jury as to the law of premises liability and the
law of comparative negligence.

The record indicates that they

did.
Along with Instruction No. 17, which provides the jury the
appropriate law regarding defendant's duty, the trial court
provided other instruction on the law of negligence, including
Instruction No. 20, dealing with comparative negligence:
If you find that the defendant was
negligent, you must decide if the plaintiff
was also negligent. If the plaintiff was
negligent and the plaintiff's negligence was
a proximate cause of the plaintiff's own
injuries, the plaintiff's negligence must be
compared to the negligence of the defendant.
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than
50 percent of the total negligence causing
the plaintiff's injuries may still recover
compensation, but the amount will be reduced
by the percentage of the plaintiff's
negligence. If the plaintiff's negligence is
equal to or greater than the negligence of
the defendant, then the plaintiff may recover
nothing. For example, if you find the
plaintiff's negligence was 30 percent of all
negligence causing the injuries, then the
plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by 30
percent. On the other hand, if you find the
plaintiff's negligence is 50 percent or
greater, then the plaintiff will recover
nothing.
R. 523, Appendix 6.

This is a correct statement of the law of

comparative negligence; plaintiff has not argued otherwise.
addition, the jury completed a Special Verdict Form which
contained interrogatories Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 providing for
22

In

findings of negligence on the part of plaintiff and allocating
damages according to the comparative negligence of the parties.
R. 502-503
Under the law of comparative negligence, the finder of fact
must first determine whether, according to applicable law, the
defendant was negligent.

That is the purpose of Instruction No.

17, to state the applicable premises liability law for
determination of defendant's negligence.

If the jury finds,

under the appropriate law, that defendant was not negligent, any
negligence of plaintiff becomes moot and need not be addressed.
If, on the other hand, the jury finds defendant to be negligent,
then the inquiry turns to whether plaintiff was also negligent
and to what extent.

Only then can the jury allocate damages.

Even if Instruction No. 17 were an erroneous statement of
the law, that error is cured by the instruction to the jury
permitting them to allocate negligence to the parties. All of
the jury instructions, read together and in context, along with
the options provided in the Special Verdict Form, properly
instructed the jury as to the law of premises liability and the
law as to comparative negligence, those two areas of law which
the jury was charged to measure against the facts.
C.

PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ISSUANCE OF
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 17 WAS PREJUDICIAL TO HIS CASE.
Even if this Court were to determine that Instruction No. 17

was erroneous, it must receive evidence of prejudice which would
justify reversal.

23

[N]ot every error in instructing a jury will
result in reversal. We reverse a trial
court's decision on the basis of an
instruction improperly submitted to the jury
only where the party challenging the
propriety of the instruction "demonstrates
prejudice stemming from the instructions
viewed in the aggregate."
Ames at 471, citations omitted.

This requires evidence that, in

absence of the alleged error, "a more favorable result would have
been obtained by the complaining party."
citing Rowley v. Graven Brothers
P2d 1209 (1971).

& Co.,

Shurtleff

Inc.

at 1174,

26 Utah 2d 448, 491

Whether an erroneous jury instruction results

in prejudice is determined "in light of all the instructions and
circumstances of the case." Ames at 474.
Plaintiff spends substantial time in a circular discussion
of the correctness of Instruction No. 17 and the propriety of
issuing the instruction to the jury.

However, no persuasive

evidence is presented that, if the instruction was erroneous, any
prejudice resulted to plaintiff.

As discussed above, it is

insufficient to rely on the jury's decision against plaintiff as
evidence of prejudice.

Plaintiff must present persuasive

evidence leading the conclusion that "a more favorable result
would have been obtained by the complaining party."
1174.

Shurtleff

at

No such evidence has been presented by plaintiff.
Even if Instruction No. 17 were erroneous in context of all

the instructions given, there is no prejudice resulting from the
alleged error.

The error is therefore harmless and does not

require reversal.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's expert testimony
due to noncompliance with the scheduling order is supported by
case law and is not an abuse of discretion•

Nor did the trial

court err in issuing Instruction No. 17 in the context of other
jury instructions and the special verdict form.

Even if this

court were to find error in the witness exclusion or issuance of
the instruction, such an error does not justify reversal because
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate prejudice with the required
sufficiency.
The judgment of the trial court should, therefore, be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1994.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

GAR^ B. 1 FERGUSON
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed first-class, postage prepaid this
\^yfJ$ay

of September, 1994 to the following:
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq.
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND
2696 N. University Ave., Suite- ^20
Provo, UT 84606
Attorneys for Appellant
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26

Tabl

GARY B. FERGUSON [A1062]
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant Blanding City
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN LAWS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
BLANDING CITY,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

DEFENDANTS FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES TO
PLAINTIFF
Civil No. 5396

Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, defendant, by and through his counsel of record, Gary
B. Ferguson, submits the following Interrogatories to plaintiff
to be answered upon oath and in writing within thirty (30) days
of service hereof.

These Interrogatories are intended to be

continuing so as to require supplemental responses to the full
extent specified in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

List all your addresses where

you have lived for the ten years prior to the April 28, 1990
accident, including the dates you moved into and out of each
residence, and the reason(s) for moving.

INTERROGATORY NO, 2:

List all addresses where you

have resided since the April 28, 1990 accident, including the
dates you moved into and out of each residence, and the reason(s)
for moving•
INTERROGATORY NO, 3:

State the names and present

addresses of all persons who lived in the same residence with you
for the ten years preceding the April 28, 1990 accident.
INTERROGATORY NO, 4:

State the names and present

addresses of all persons who have lived in the same residence
with you from the time of the April 28, 1990 accident to the
present, and state the dates during which such persons lived with
you and the purposes of such residence.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

If you have served in the

military, state the date and place of discharge and type of
discharge which you received.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

If you received a medical

disability from the military, or were not allowed to serve in the
military for medical reasons, describe the details of the
physical or mental deficiency which was the basis for this
medical disability and the amount of disability assigned to you.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

With respect to each health

care provider who has treated or examined you since April 28,
1990, state:
a.

Name;

b.

Address;

c.

Profession;
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d.

Date(s) of treatment or examination;

e.

Reasons for treatment or examination;

f.

Treatment or examination received.

INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

With respect to each hospital

or clinic or institution in which you have been treated or
examined since April 28, 1990, state:
a.

Name;

b.

Address;

c.

Date(s) of treatment or examination;

d.

Reason for treatment or examination;

e.

Treatment or examination received.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

State the places and dates and

the names and addresses of all persons and/or institutions who
rendered assistance in your personal care, your household work,
your occupation or education because of injuries you received on
April 28, 1990.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

If you have recovered from any

of the injuries received in the April 28, 1990 accident, describe
the injury, state approximately where and by whom you were last
examined or given medical treatment with respect to the injuries
you received and from which you have recovered.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

Were you disabled as a result

of the accident?
INTERROGATORY NO. 12:
a.

If SO, state:

A description of the disability;

3

b.

The percentage of disability, if you received

such a rating;
c.

If such rating was made, the name and address

of the person making the rating;
d.

Whether the disability is temporary or

permanent; and if temporary, when it is expected to
terminate.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

List all your past employers

for the ten years preceding the April 28, 1990 accident.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

List all your employers since

the April 28, 1990 accident, and give a job description for each
employer.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

Do you claim your future

earning capacity has been impaired?
INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

If so, State:

a.

The amount claimed for such future loss;

b.

The basis upon which such computation is

made.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17:

Have you been hospitalized

during your lifetime as a result of any injury or illness, other
then that described in your Answer to interrogatory No. 8?

4

INTERROGATORY NO, 18:

If so, in each instance,

state:
a.

The name and address of the hospital;

b.

The name and address of the doctor who

treated you;
c.

If a traumatic injury, describe how it was

d.

The nature and extent of the injury or

e.

Describe any disability you sustained as a

caused;

illness;

result of the injury or illness;
f.

Whether a claim or a lawsuit was filed as a

result thereof;
g.

If a claim was filed, the person or firm

against whom the claim was made;
h.

If a lawsuit was filed, where the lawsuit was

filed, the name and caption of the lawsuit, and the court in
which it was filed.
INTERROGATORY NO. 19:

Have you ever filed a claim

for medical expenses or compensation as a result of any
industrial injury?
INTERROGATORY NO. 20:

If so, for each instance,

state:
a.

The name and address of the employer;

b.

When said injuries were incurred;
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c.

The names and addresses of the doctors who

treated you;
d.

The nature and extent of the injuries,

including any disability rating given; and
e.

The name of the entity providing benefits.

INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

Were you suffering from any

illness or physical disability immediately prior to the accident
described in the Complaint?
INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

If so, state the nature and

type of each illness or disability.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23:

Have you suffered any injuries

or incurred any illness after the accident referred to in the
Complaint?
INTERROGATORY NO. 24:

If so, for each such illness

or injury, state:
a.

The date it occurred;

b.

Where and how it occurred;

c.

The nature and extent of the injury or

d.

The name and address of the doctors and

illness;

physicians who treated you;
e.

Whether any lawsuit was brought against any

person by reason of the illness or injury, and if so, the
name of the court wherein the lawsuit was brought, the name
of the parties, and the name of the case, and whether said
lawsuit was tried or settled.
6

INTERROGATORY NO. 25:

Identify each person who you

expect of call as an expert witness at trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 26:

State the subject matter on

which each said expert is expected to testify, state the
substance of the facts and opinions to which said expert is
expected to testify, and state a summary of grounds for each
opinion.
INTERROGATORY NO. 27:

Identify each expert who has

been retained or specially employed in anticipation or litigation
or preparation for trial but who is not expected to be called as
a witness at trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 28:

Please list the name, address,

and telephone number of every fact witness known to you or your
counsel who has personal information concerning the accident.
INTERROGATORY NO. 29:

Have you or anyone on your

behalf obtained a statement for any witnesses listed in
Interrogatory No. 28?

If so, state:

a.

The date the statement was obtained;

b.

The name and address of the person obtaining

the statement;
c.

Whether the statement was oral or written;

d.

The subject matter of the statement;

e.

The name and address of the person currently

having custody of such statement.
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DATED this (Q-TE-1 day of December, 1991.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

Attorney for Defendant
Bland\ng City

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed by first-class mail, postage
prepaid on this

/y

day of December, 1991 to the following:

Michael A. Harrison, Esq.
FRANDSEN, KELLER & JENSEN
90 W. 100 N.
Price, UT 84501
Attorneys for Plaintiff

a*Jn<f&>
yf2&U2L.
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Tab 2

LAW OFFICES OF

WILLIAMS & HUNT
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
257 EAST 200 SOUTH , SUITE 500
P.O. BOX 45678
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678

IARY B.FERGUSON

N o v e m b e r 24

1993
'

TELEPHONE (sou 521-5578
FAX (801) 364-4500

VIA FACSIMILE
Darwin Fisher, Esq.
2696 N. University Avenue
Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604
Re:

Laws v. Blanding City
Our File No. 5ULGT-3007

Dear Darwin:
I have reviewed your letter of November 23, 1993 regarding the proposed
depositions in Blanding on Wednesday and Thursday, December 8 and 9, 1993.
I will not be able to attend depositions on those days. However, Kurt
Frankenburg who took the deposition of Dr. Edgerton will be able to cover
depositions in Blanding on those days. I have spoken with Norm Johnson, the city
manager for Blanding City. He will contact each one of the witnesses on your list
who are either city employees or city office holders to determine whether or not they
can appear for depositions on the days that have been selected. As soon as he gets
back to me, I will forward that information to you. I know, at least for now, that
Norm Johnson will be there for his deposition on December 8. For your information,
the city employees are Norm Johnson, Jeff Black and Mark Shumway. The city
office holders or elected officials are Steve Palmer, Jim Slavens and Jim Shumway.
None of the other individuals listed in your letter are employees or representatives of
my client. Therefore, I have no control over whether or not they will appear at the
for a deposition.
You have listed Stan Perkins as a witness to be deposed. Mr. Perkins'
deposition was taken earlier in this case on September 22, 1992. If you do not have a
copy of that deposition, I will be happy to forward it to you. I will object to him
being redeposed unless you can show me that there is good cause for doing that.

With reference to Dr. Burton, I have designated him as an expert witness to be
used, potentially, in rebuttal to Dr. Edgerton. At this time, so long as Dr. Edgerton's
testimony does not change, I do not foresee using Dr. Burton as an expert witness.
If, however, Dr. Edgerton's testimony changes to something not known to me, I may
then be forced to call Dr. Burton as a true rebuttal witnesses.
In the last several weeks, you told me that you would inform me of who would
actually be your expert witness on liability. I still do not have that information. Since
I do not have the information I cannot notice up that expert witness. This presents a
problem for me given the December 10, 1993 discovery cutoff. Please advise me as
soon as you can of the name of the liability expert witness who you intend to use so
that we can make arrangements to have that witness's deposition taken on or before
December 10, 1993 it at all possible.
I feel that you have allotted too much time for many of these depositions.
Therefore, I would like to start them earlier or end them earlier. Please let me know.
Very truly yours,
[JLIAMS&HUNT

Gary B. Ferguson

GBF/rt
Enc.
24975

Tab 3

FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND
• A Professional Corporation

Attorneys and Counselors at Law
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220
Provo, Utah 84604
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER
DARWIN C. FISHER*
). GRANT MOODY T
r. MCKAY STIRLAND*

December 6,

1993

Telephone: (801)375-5600
Facsimile: (801) 375-5607
Atea-admittedin Washington,*
Oregon,1 and Arizona*

Gary B. Ferguson, Esq.
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Re:

Laws v. Blanding City

Dear Gary,
This is to inform you that Greg Thorpe of ECKHOFF, WATSON &
PREATOR Engineering will be the expert witness we will use at
trial.
I am in the process of sending information to Mr. Thorpe for
his evaluation and therefore he obviously has not had an
opportunity to review the information and form an opinion.
Once he has formed an opinion, I will inform you and at that
point you can decide whether or not you wish to take his
deposition.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
>CM~*~^ ^

^^3<>^^.

Darwin C. Fisher
Attorney at Law
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C,
DCF:cf

Tab 4

DARWIN C. FISHER, 1080
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER, P.C., 4910
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220
Provo, UT
84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600

FILED

DEC 1 * H 3
CLERK OF TH£ COURT

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN LAWS,

:

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S ANSWERS TO
DEFENDANTS INTERROGATORIES
AND RESPONSES TO REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

:

BLANDING CITY,

:

Defendant.

Civil No.5396
(Judge Lyle R. Anderson)

:

COMES now Plaintiff, Melvin Laws, by and through his attorney
Darwin C. Fisher and answers Defendant's Request to Supplement
Answers to Interrogatories and Responses to Request for Production
of Documents.
INTERROGATORY NO. 25;

Identify each person who you expect

of (sic) call as an expert witness at trial.
ANSWER:

Greg Thorpe, Eckhoff, Watson & Preator Engineering,

1121 E. 3900 South, Building C, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, UT
84124.
INTERROGATORY NO, 26:

State the subject matter on which

each said expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts
and opinions to which said expert is expected to testify, and
provide a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
ANSWER;

Mr. Thorpe is expected to testify concerning the

design, construction, maintenance, and safety, etc. of Blanding
City landfill. We have not received the opinion of Mr. Thorpe. As
soon as we receive his opinion, we will provide the information
required by Interrogatory No. 26.
INTERROGATORY NO, 27:

Identify each expert who has been

retained or specially employed in anticipation or (sic) litigation
or preparation for trail but who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial.
ANSWER:

Please see answer to Interrogatory No. 25 and

previous answers to Interrogatory No. 27.
INTERROGATORY NO. 28:

Please list the name, address, and

telephone number of every fact witness known to you or your counsel
who has personal

information concerning

the accident or the

injuries you sustained in the accident.
ANSWER:

Please see previous answers to Interrogatory No. 28

and Plaintiff's witness list which has been provided to Defendant.
REQUEST NO. 1;

Produce all documents

relied upon in

answering the accompanying Interrogatories.
ANSWER;

Plaintiff

did

not
2

rely

upon

any

documents

in

answering the Request to Supplement Answers to Interrogatories and
Responses to Request for Production of Documents except those
specificially referred to and which are in the possession of
Defendant.
REQUEST NO. 4:

Produce a copy of all reports received

from all expert witnesses retained by plaintiff's counsel in this
action, which expert witnesses are expected to testify on behalf of
the plaintiff.
ANSWER;
witnesses.

Plaintiff has not received any reports from expert
When such reports are received, Plaintiff will make

available to Defendants the information required by Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this

day of December, 1993.
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C.

DARWIN C. FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiff
Mel Laws
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, with postage prepaid , this

day of December, 1993:

Gary B. Ferguson
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678

SECRETARY/
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
FILED

PER " 2 1994
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY
Oaputy

In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of San Juan County
State of Utah
RULING ON MOTION
TO STRIKE DESIGNATION
OF EXPERT WITNESS

MELVIN LAWS,
Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. 9107-5396

BLANDING CITY,
Defendant,

The original scheduling order entered in this matter required both parties to designate expert witnesses by August 15, 1993.
Thereafter, the Court entered an Amended Scheduling Order, with
the agreement of the parties, requiring designation of all witnesses by September 30, 1993. Discovery cutoff was set for December 10, 1993.
On September 30, 1993, plaintiff designated the engineering
firm of Eckhoff, Watson & Preator as its expert witness, but did
not provide the name of the individual in that firm who would
testify.

On November 24, 1993, and following intervening dis-

cussions on the subject, defendants counsel wrote to plaintiff's
counsel and asked him to provide the name of the witness as soon
as possible so that the deposition could be taken before December
10, 1993. On December 6, 1993, counsel for plaintiff responded

1

and named Gary Thorpe as the expert witness, at the same time
stating that Mr. Thorpe would not have formed an opinion until
after he had reviewed information that was still "in the process"
of being sent to him.

This letter was received by defendant's

counsel on December 13, 1993.
Defendant has moved to strike the designation of Gary Thorpe
as an expert witness pursuant to Rule 16(d), U.R.C.P., which authorizes such relief for failure to comply with a scheduling
order.

Plaintiff maintains that he technically complied with the

order and that there is no prejudice from the failure to comply
with the spirit of the order.

Plaintiff claims that his case

will be severely prejudiced if he is unable to produce expert
testimony on whether the Blanding City dump was safe in its design, construction, maintenance and operation.

Plaintiff has of-

fered no explanation for failing to have an individual expert
ready with an opinion before the discovery cutoff.
In Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1993), the Utah
Supreme Court upheld striking the testimony of a medical expert
in a medical malpractice case.
for the defendant.

The effect was summary judgment

The expert in question was named three months

after the designation deadline and five weeks before trial and
was the second expert designated by the plaintiff.

The opinion

of the first expert was insufficient to withstand summary judgment.
Plaintiff did not properly designate his expert witness
until he provided the name of an individual.
2

It is unreasonable

to expect a party fi examine every member of a fi i: in i n order to
make sure that the eventual witness has been deposed.
pert who has not

formed an opinion

Further-

expert must, at the

very least, be prepared with an opinion within a reasonable time
lit "

i in Is.

""

•-. - assential to plaintiff's case that he have
expert

:he design, construction, maintenance aiid operatxun of

dump^

m s are something within the ken of ordinary citizens.

Though expert testimony may

helpfu

• xpects that

members of the
negligently operated the dump without tille assistance

> -

pert.

action reluctantly because
parties :i

presentatio;

of expert testimony,

rdinarj -.\ prefers not

t «-:.•"-

^ ;.

^t the
vidence

iddition, i t i s important to emphasize

the importance of schedul^**^ orders in efficient trial

This matter is scheduled for trial beginning <•' - - - - - February 22, 1994

on

allocated for the trial.

DATED 111 is

trict Court Judge

3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the forgoing RULING ON MOTION TO STRIKE DESIGNATION OF EXPERT
WITNESS, postage prepaid, to the following:
Darwin C. Fisher
Thomas J. Scribner
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2696 N. University Avenue. Suite 220
Provo,

UT

84604

Gary B. Ferguson
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant
PO Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
DATED t h i s

and

day of February, 1993.
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INSTRUCTION NO,

/ /

Blanding City is subject to liabili ty for physical harm caused
to Melvin Laws by a dangerous condition at t .1 le Blanding City dump #

~ iangerous condition, or by the
* *^asonable care should !^ • - discovered the

exercise

^

dangerov

dangerous condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm
i Laws
11")

and

should expect thai W

02- realize the danger, or wt
1 1 • I 1 1 /1 • 1 1

w:

"I '",« ' J I M -ver
. protect himself

iI

(Y)

Blanding

City

then

failed

to

exercise

reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws I rom the dangerous
I i 1" i ( I n .

INSTRUCTION NO.

/

Reasonable care is what an ordinary, prudent person uses in
similar situations. The amount of care that is considered
"reasonable" depends on the situation.

You must decide what a

prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar
situation.

Negligence may arise in acting or failing to act.

INSTRUCTION NO. /*?

A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which
natural and continuous sequence, produces t^
w

*ed. A

in

injury and without
Dximate cai ise is

one which sets in operation the factors that accompl ish the
injury*

INSTRUCTION NO. 2 0

If you find that the defendant was negligent, you must decide
if the plaintiff was also negligent. If the plaintiff was negligent
and the plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's own injuries, the plaintiff's negligence must be
compared to the negligence of the defendant.
A plaintiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent of the
total negligence causing the plaintiff's injuries may still recover
compensation, but the amount will be reduced by the percentage of
the plaintiff's negligence. If the plaintiff's negligence is equal
to or greater than Jthe negligence of the defendant^ -f-thB iuefcgj.
jfegllgonco of all dofondantey], then the plaintiff may recover
nothing. For example, if you find the plaintiff's negligence was 30
percent

of

all

negligence

causing

the

injuries,

then

the

plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by 3 0 percent. On the other
hand, if you find the plaintiff's negligence is 50 percent or
greater, then the plaintiff will recover nothing.

INSTRUCTION fa). ^3
^ t o TT
I will submit

6

idings of fact as to the questions

making your findings of fact, you should

bear

a xniuu \~ua\~ u.

i

le party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be

>l i ,:}ai1 ed lac I; rests

proved by a preponderance

/idence.
^ l r y *ay find

Tin's
and return .* .« .

, -

to each guestic

1

qufst i in \
to

11 ii, , i A

each, question,-

have

*

* -,: *

.: ** e answer

uceu not u& une s
mnrp n*P von V > R V ^ agreed on the answer

*. :

verdict

* .qne 1 and dated

by

your

foreperson and then r etun

/
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Ji""i C"->""-.iy

B«°
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTBY

FEB 2 h 199^
^ E R K 0 F ™E COURT
Deputy

OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN LAWS,

Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

vs.
BLANDING CITY,
Defendant.

Civil No.5396
(Judge Lyle R. Anderson)

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of
the evidence.

If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of

the issue presented, answer "YES". If you find the evidence is so
equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against
the issue presented, answer "NO". Also, any damages assessed must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Was the defendant, Blanding City, negligent as alleged by
Plaintiff?

ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

2. Was defendant Blanding City's negligence a proximate cause
of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

A

If you answered "NO" to either questions 1 or 2, then stop
here and have the foreman sign the special verdict.

3. Was the plaintiff negligent, as alleged by the defendant?
ANSWER:

4.

Yes

No

Was the plaintiff's negligence a proximate cause of

plaintiff's injuries?
ANSWER:

5.

Yes

No

If you answered questions 1 and 2 "Yes", then, and only

then, answer the following question:

Assuming all the negligence

that proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries to total 100%,
what percentage of that negligence is attributable to:

2

A.

Plaintiff Melvin Laws

%

B.

Defendant Blanding City

%

TOTAL

6.

100 %

If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "Yes11, state the

amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the
plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries.

Special Damages
A.

Past Special Damages

$.

B.

Future Special Damages $_

General Damages

$_

TOTAL

$_

DATED this o(j

day of February, 1994.

Foreman
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